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Summary - We suggest a seven-grade model for the evolution of causal cognition as a framework that 
can be used to gauge variation in the complexity of causal reasoning from the panin-hominin split until the 
appearance of cognitively modern hunter-gatherer communities. The intention is to put forward a cohesive 
model for the evolution of causal cognition in humans, which can be assessed against increasingly fine-
grained empirical data from the palaeoanthropological and archaeological records. We propose that the 
tracking behaviour (i.e., the ability to interpret and follow external, inanimate, visual clues of hominins) 
provides a rich case study for tracing the evolution of causal cognition in our lineage. The grades of causal 
cognition are tentatively linked to aspects of the Stone Age/Palaeolithic archaeological record. Our model 
can also be applied to current work in evolutionary psychology and research on causal cognition, so that an 
inter-disciplinary understanding and correlation of processes becomes increasingly possible.
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Introduction
In its simplest form, causal cognition allows 
us to do three important things: a) to predict 
outcomes based on observations, b) to affect 
and control events in the world around us, and 
c) ultimately, to predict causes from effects, even 
if the causes are not perceivable. Since Hume 
(1964 [1739]), philosophers have considered our 
abilities to gain causal knowledge, and to reason 
about outcomes based on it, key to the human 
way of thinking. Both humans and animals use 
basic associative mechanisms to learn about 
causal relations (e.g., Dickenson & Shanks, 
1995). Nonhuman, tool-using primates have 
some comprehension of the association between 
a tool and its effects, but they generally do not 
grasp relationships between the underlying 
physical principles of tool use (e.g., Povinelli, 
2000; Blaisdell et al., 2006; Penn & Povinelli, 
2007). Humans, on the other hand, demonstrate 
a more profound understanding of causal rela-
tions, and a capacity for predicting causal inter-
ventions, which generally cannot be reduced to 
associative learning (e.g., Gopnik et al., 2004; 
Waldman & Hagmayer, 2005). 
Across disciplines, the evolution of causal 
cognition is thus progressively coming to the fore 
as a potential explanatory framework for what it 
is that makes us human. Work has focussed on 
the link between causal cognition and technol-
ogy (e.g., Wolpert, 2003; McCormack et al., 
2011), the early origins of causal cognition in 
hominins (e.g., Stuart-Fox, 2014), and bridg-
ing the archaeological record with causal cog-
nition (e.g., Haidle, 2014). Assessing levels of 
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causal understanding in animals and nonhu-
man primates also contributes to the discourse 
(e.g., Premack & Premack, 1994; Visalberghi 
& Tomasello, 1998; Povinelli, 2000; Blaisdell et 
al., 2006), and currently it seems that the capac-
ity for causal reasoning in chimpanzees is not 
much greater than in rats or corvids (McGrew, 
2013). Povinelli & Bering (2002) suggested that 
a key advance in hominin cognitive evolution 
was the development of ‘a new representational 
system’, enabling our ancestors to ‘reinterpret’ 
the observable world by referencing unobserv-
able physical and mental causes (also see Stuart-
Fox, 2014). 
Here we use the evolution of tracking behav-
iour (the ability to interpret and follow exter-
nal, inanimate clues) in hominins and humans 
as a case study to hypothetically trace the roots 
and development of causal cognition. Tracking 
behaviour does not necessarily represent the sole 
performance demonstrating the presence of each 
grade, in many cases a range of technologies or 
social behaviours can be used similarly. We also 
do not imply that tracking was the main impe-
tus for the development of every grade of causal 
understanding – almost certainly, a whole range 
of circumstances would have converged to hone 
each grade through time. Tracking is, however, 
a uniquely human behaviour that represents a 
continuous heuristic thread throughout the evo-
lution of our causal cognition, which renders it 
a useful tool in its exploration. Partly following 
Woodward (2011), we see a development from 
thinking about your own actions as causes, via 
the actions of others as causes, to inanimate 
forces as causes. We present this development as 
a series of seven grades. 
Grades of causal understanding 
Woodward (2011) identified three levels of 
causal learning that could reflect variation in the 
complexity of causal thinking. The basic level 
is the ability to learn that one’s own physical 
actions can cause certain outcomes. For exam-
ple, a baby will learn that kicking its foot will 
move an object, such as a mobile. He refers to 
this as ‘egocentric learning’, based on ordinary 
operant or instrumental conditioning. On the 
second level is the ‘agent causal learner’, who also 
learns about cause from the actions of others. At 
this level, it is understood that there are causal 
relationships between one’s own actions, their 
outcomes, and interventions by either oneself or 
others. It is thus possible to integrate informa-
tion so that it is understood that the outcomes 
of the interventions of others have implications 
for what would result from their own interven-
tions and vice versa (Woodward, 2011). For 
example, a young chimpanzee is able to grasp, 
through observation, that if her mother is able 
to crack a nut by using a hammer stone, she too 
should be able to achieve a similar result by fol-
lowing similar actions. According to Woodward’s 
(2011) definition of this level of causal learning, 
the chimpanzee infant would grasp that other 
chimpanzees should be able to reproduce the 
same outcome based on making the same obser-
vations and following the same actions (agent 
causal learner). 
On the third level is the ‘observation/action 
causal learner’. Woodward (2011, p.38) presents 
the following example: “Thus when I put water 
on plants and it grows, when I observe you put 
water on a plant and it grows, and when I observe 
rain falling on a plant and it grows, I assume that 
the very same sort of causal relationship between 
water and plant growth is present in all three 
cases and that observation of any one of these 
cases can furnish information about the other”. 
Such a learner is able to learn and understand 
relationships between their own actions and the 
potential outcomes thereof, the actions of others 
and their potential outcomes, as well as the fact 
that the observation of a range of natural signs 
or patterns can be integrated with the egocen-
tric and action-causal observations, actions and 
outcomes. It is thus understood that all three 
causal-knowledge sets are able to inform on each 
other. Woodward (2011, pp.38-39) notes that 
the available empirical evidence suggests that 
apes are not observation/action causal learners 
(also see Tomasello & Call, 1997).
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Building from Woodward (2011), we pro-
pose a more nuanced perspective on the emer-
gence of causal cognition in humans, and focus 
on the degree to which the cause is perceivable, 
imaginable, purely abstract, and interchangeable 
between knowledge domains. Our framework 
partly follows the distinction between cued and 
detached mental representations introduced by 
Gärdenfors (1995, 2003), and builds on the 
model of events as mappings from force vectors 
to result vectors (e.g., Gärdenfors & Warglien, 
2012; Warglien et al., 2012; Gärdenfors, 2014), 
as well as on the concept of causal grammar (e.g., 
Tenenbaum & Niyogi, 2003). As a result, we 
distinguish seven grades of causal understanding, 
based on their level of detachment from egocen-
tric learning or individual understanding, some 
of which (such as grades 3 and 4 below) might 
have evolved parallel to each other.
Grade 1: Individual causal understanding
The first grade involves a direct connection 
between a perceived force that an individual 
exerts and the resulting effect. Typical examples 
are a baby kicking its foot, learning the connec-
tion between motor commands and the result-
ing actions, or a kitten playing with a toy. In this 
case both the cause and the effect are directly 
perceived. The result is that the individual expe-
riences its own agency. This grade need not 
involve strong cognitive mechanisms, but can be 
explained via learning by conditioning.
Grade 2: Cued dyadic-causal understanding
This grade involves two individuals who 
take turns in performing a similar action. One 
example is two children on a seesaw. One child 
first perceives that pushing with her legs on the 
ground makes her side of the seesaw go up and 
then she sees that when the other child pushes 
his feet in a similar way the other side goes up. 
The force of the other child is not directly per-
ceived, but it is inferred via a simple mapping 
onto one’s own force (mirror neurons are pre-
sumably involved in such an inference). Thus, 
I understand that your action causes an effect 
because it gives the same result as my action. 
Another example is the rough-and-tumble play 
that all mammal juveniles (including humans) 
engage in (Bekoff & Byers, 1998). On this grade, 
I understand your agency.
Grade 3: Conspecific mindreading
Humans understand how our desires, inten-
tions and beliefs lead to different kinds of actions. 
For example, when I am thirsty, I go to the refrig-
erator because I believe I will find something to 
drink. By watching your actions, I infer your 
state of mind under the hypothesis that your 
desires, intentions and beliefs are similar to mine. 
When I see you take out a bottle of juice from 
the refrigerator, I infer that you are thirsty. In this 
case, I do not perceive the cause of your action, 
but I use my understanding of your inner state as 
a hidden variable for the cause of your action (see 
Gärdenfors, 2007). On this evolutionary grade, 
desires, intentions and beliefs are seen as ‘mental 
forces’ causing the action. 
One example of detached dual-causal under-
standing is gaze following, i.e., understanding that 
if someone is looking firmly in a particular direc-
tion, there is something worthy of attention in 
that direction. In other words, the onlooker infers 
that there is a cause for the gaze direction, even 
if the onlooker itself cannot perceive the cause. 
Conspecific co-orientation through following gaze 
direction provides adaptive advantages regarding 
predator awareness, food detection and/or for the 
monitoring of social interactions (e.g., Schloegl 
et al., 2007, p.769). Gaze following is a behav-
iour that develops early during human infancy. At 
about 10-11 months old, infants become adept 
at gaze following, and by 12-18 months old, they 
engage in target sharing and joint visual percep-
tion (Metlzhoff & Brooks 2007).
There is an intensive debate among research-
ers in animal cognition concerning the extent to 
which non-human animals can read the minds 
of conspecifics. Some evidence for gaze following 
exists for a few bird species, dogs, seals and even 
goats (e.g., Schloegl et al., 2007; Shepherd, 2010; 
Teglas et al., 2012). Most nonhuman evidence, 
however, is generated from work with primates. 
For example, gaze following has been observed 
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in great apes such as chimpanzees, gorillas, and 
bonobos (e.g., Tomasello et al., 2007), as well 
as in rhesus monkeys (Emery et al., 1997) and 
lemurs (e.g., Sheperd & Platt, 2008).  In gaze 
following, the gaze direction of the conspecific is 
seen as a cue to an object or event that is of inter-
est. This can be interpreted as reasoning from 
the effect – the attention – to the cause –  the 
object or event. When it comes to the capacity to 
understand the intentions of others, there is very 
limited research concerning animals (Tomasello 
et al., 2005; Gärdenfors, 2007). Similarly, the 
evidence for non-human animals understand-
ing the beliefs of conspecifics is very limited (but 
see Hare et al.,  2000; Tomasello & Call, 2006; 
Krupenye et al., 2016). 
A special case of mindreading is self-awareness, 
that is, reading the mind of oneself (Gärdenfors, 
2003, 2007). Self-awareness involves the ability 
to imagine myself in the future and in the past, 
Grade 3 therefore includes early forms of men-
tal time travel (e.g., Suddendorf & Corballis, 
2007; Gärdenfors & Osvath, 2010; Osvath, 
2015), basic episodic memory (e.g., Tulving, 
1972, 1985; Osvath, 2010), basic working 
memory (e.g., Coolidge & Wynn, 2005), and 
priority scheduling (planning depth or extended 
thought-and-action sequences [e.g., Haidle, 
2014; Haidle et al., 2015]). Regarding episodic 
memory, Tulving (1985) argues that this kind of 
memory is not only directed to the past, but also 
makes it possible to imagine future situations 
and recombining elements from memories into 
new wholes (also see Osvath, 2015).
Grade 4: Detached dyadic-causal understanding
Sometimes we do not perceive another’s pres-
ence, but only the traces of them. An example is 
when I come home and find your coat on a chair 
and infer that you have been in the room recently. 
The cause is detached from the present situation 
(Gärdenfors, 1995). I don’t see you, but your 
presence in the past is the most plausible cause 
for your coat being there. I am familiar with you 
wearing your coat and have observed you leaving 
it on the chair repeatedly, so I easily form a ‘men-
tal image’ of you doing so. I infer your agency, 
which lead to the presence of the coat. This grade 
depends on the capacity to entertain two mental 
representations at the same time, that is, the cur-
rent perceptual state of seeing your coat together 
with my imagination of you being present in 
the room, i.e., “observed effect, inferred cause, 
and the relationship between them” (Stuart-Fox, 
2014, pp.261-262). In children, this capacity 
develops between 19 and 22 months (Gelman, 
2009) and it shows up clearly in pretence play 
where the perceived world and the pretended 
interpretation must be available simultaneously 
(e.g., Leslie, 1987). Stuart-Fox (2014, p.256) 
writes that this opens “the way for conscious 
causal reasoning from observed effect to unob-
served cause to develop in children during their 
third year of life” (see also Gopnik, 2000).
Several experiments and observations indi-
cate that monkeys and apes often do not infer 
physical causes from their effects (e.g., Povinelli, 
2000, but see Mulcahy & Call, 2006), hence 
they do not reach Grade 4. One example from 
Cheney & Seyfarth (1990) involves vervets. 
When these monkeys catch sight of a python or a 
leopard, they emit warning cries. To test whether 
they can interpret a ‘sign’ that there are predators 
in the vicinity, i.e., reason from the effect of a 
predator to its cause, Cheney & Seyfarth made 
a false python track in the sand that was later 
observed by a group of vervets. The monkeys did 
not react to the track, even though pythons are 
highly dangerous to them. A group of vervets was 
also observed passing a real python track with-
out reacting. Yet, as soon as they came across the 
snake, panic broke out. Likewise, the monkeys 
did not react when the scientists suspended an 
antelope carcass from a tree, despite the fact that 
this was a clear sign of the presence of a leopard 
in the vicinity (Cheney & Seyfarth, 1990). 
In our analysis, this is the grade where 
humans seem to be separated from other spe-
cies. Being able to reason from effects to non-
present causes seems to be unique to humans. In 
line with this, Tomasello & Call (1997) suggest 
that apes are not observation/action causal learn-
ers in the sense of Woodward (2011). However, 
to some extent, apes can reason from traces to 
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present causes. One example is that some apes 
have learnt to scribble with pencils and paint 
with their fingers. They understand the connec-
tion between the marks or paint on the paper 
and their actions (Persson, 2007, Ch. 10). 
Another example is the chimpanzee Austin who, 
when seeing his shadow on a wall would move in 
unusual ways and note the effects on the shadow 
(Savage-Rumbaugh et al., 1998). These examples 
suggest that apes are at the brink of Grade 4. It 
is possible that future evidence about apes in the 
wild will show that they have achieved this grade.
Grade 5: Causal understanding and mindreading 
of non-conspecifics
We sometimes have a dyadic-causal under-
standing of the actions and intentions of other 
species, although their motor actions and cogni-
tive processes are different from ours. The most 
interesting case for the purposes of this paper is 
human detached causal understanding of non-
human animals. For example, when I see an 
animal track, I can sometimes infer the cause. 
If I recognise the track as that of a springbok, 
I can form a mental image of the cause, since 
I have seen springbok many times. If the track 
is unfamiliar, however, I cannot conjure a cor-
responding mental image (cf. the Heffalump of 
Winnie the Pooh). With increased experience, I 
may also be able to infer the mental states of the 
animal, for example, if the tracks go in the direc-
tion of the waterhole, I draw the conclusion that 
the springbok is thirsty. The difference, between 
Grades 3 and 4 on the one hand, and Grade 5 on 
the other, is gradual and depends to a large extent 
on the experience of the behaviour of other spe-
cies. The actions and mental states of other ani-
mals map less directly onto our own, since their 
bodies and presumably their inner worlds are dif-
ferent, but we can learn the mapping. The map-
ping is a matter of degree, though – we find it 
easier to read the causal forces in the mind of a 
chimpanzee or a dog than that of an iguana.
Grade 6: Inanimate causal understanding
We reach a more advanced grade of causal 
understanding when we can ascribe causal roles 
to inanimate objects. I see an apple falling from 
the tree and at the same time I feel a gust of 
wind. I infer that the wind exerted a force on 
the ripe apple that made it fall off the branch – 
the cause has not been directly perceived, but is 
inferred. Unlike the previous cases, there is no 
animate agent that performs an action. For this 
grade it can be argued that causation is seen as 
force transmission (Povinelli, 2000; Wolff, 2007; 
Gärdenfors & Warglien, 2012) as an extension 
of agency. This could be proposed as a candidate 
for the new representational system suggested by 
Povinelli & Bering (2002).
In children one finds extensive forms of 
animistic reasoning, i.e., inanimate physical 
forces are ascribed to some hypothetical animate 
cause. For example, Piaget (1930, p.174) writes 
that the child “fills the world with spontane-
ous movements and living ‘forces’; the heavenly 
bodies may rest or move as they please, clouds 
make wind by themselves, waves ‘raise’ them-
selves, trees swing their branches spontaneously 
to make a breeze”. Inanimate objects are seen as 
agents, that is, in the terminology of Woodward 
(2011), children are only agent causal learners, 
but have not yet become observation/action cas-
ual learners. This tendency indicates that inani-
mate causal understanding takes time to achieve 
in human development. 
From an evolutionary point of view an inter-
esting question is what could represent the driv-
ing force behind the human capacity for inani-
mate causal reasoning. In our opinion, tool use 
or technology played an important role. Tools 
extend your peripersonal space – they allow you 
to act at a distance and to alter the force pat-
terns generated by your body. When you hit a 
nut with a stone you magnify the forces acting 
on the nut compared to pounding on the nut 
with your hand and when you poke with a stick 
into a hole you extend the poking abilities of 
your fingers. Such tool use represents basic causal 
understanding that can be roughly associated 
with Grades 1 and 2. Even further extension of 
your peripersonal space is achieved when the tool 
leaves the direct control of your body and exerts 
it force at a distance. Throwing a stone may be 
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the first method of force transmission at a dis-
tance. During the evolution of the hominins, not 
only the shape of the hand but also the shoulder 
section changed in such a way that made throw-
ing much more effective (Roach et al., 2013). 
This ability to act with accuracy and speed at a 
distance was then expanded by technologies that 
allow a more concentrated form of the hitting 
force, such as the tip of a spear. Spear throwing 
can therefore serve as an example of well-devel-
oped inanimate causal understanding. 
Grade 7: Causal network understanding 
We suggest that the most complex grade 
of causal cognition is the understanding of 
how domain-specific causal node sets con-
nect or link to inter-domain causal networks 
(e.g., Tenenbaum & Niyogi, 2003). The most 
advanced form of this kind of reasoning is sci-
ence, but some developmental psychologists 
claim that children learn about the causal con-
nections of the world much as scientists do. This 
is the so-called theory-theory of child develop-
ment (e.g., Gopnik et al., 1999).
Returning to our apple example, once it is 
understood that the wind can cause an apple to 
fall, causal network understanding will allow me 
to grasp that the wind can also cause other things 
to fall or move. I can also understand that coun-
terforces will block causes. Such understanding 
could help me to find ways to secure objects, pre-
venting them from being blown off, over or away 
by the wind. An abstract understanding of the fas-
tening skills obtained during the above scenario 
can now be used in completely different contexts, 
for example, fixing a knife blade to a handle, or 
fixing a hide cover to a shelter framework made 
of branches. Abstractly understanding that ‘wind 
exerts a force that causes movement’ and that I can 
control movement by counterforces, for example 
through fastening technologies, enables me to 
transfer such knowledge into innovative solutions 
across problem domains. For example, my knowl-
edge can be used to make things move, such as 
fixing a sail to a watercraft, to conceptualise and 
construct a windmill, or to design and build a 
helicopter, etc. ad infinitum. In addition, my 
mindreading abilities will translate at least some 
of the ideas/actions above into the notion that I 
could apply the knowledge and/or technologies in 
a social context, securing reciprocity, status and/or 
another form of delayed or direct return/advan-
tage for myself and/or my group. During this 
grade of causal understanding, aspects of all the 
previous causal understanding grades can be inte-
grated and/or mapped onto each other into never-
ending patterns of recursion and complexity. 
It should be clear that we do not view causal 
cognition as independent of other forms of cogni-
tion. The first grade only involves perception of 
agency, but for later grades an increasing array of 
cognitive processes are involved, such as mind-read-
ing, extended working memory, episodic memory, 
mental time travel and planning. Especially grades 
6 and 7 build on a rich battery of cognitive capaci-
ties. Comparing ours with Woodward’s (2011) 
classification; his egocentric learner corresponds to 
our Grade 1, his agent causal learner corresponds 
to our grades 2-4, Grade 5 is intermediary and 
his observation/action causal learner corresponds 
to our grades 6-7. We submit that our classifica-
tion provides a more fine-grained understanding 
of the evolution of causal cognition. In particular, 
by splitting Woodward’s agent causal learners into 
grades 2-4, we can conclude that non-human ani-
mals manage grade 2, do it less well than humans 
on grade 3 and are very limited when it comes 
to grade 4. One speculation concerning the dif-
ference is that non-human animals understand 
causation only in terms of agency, while humans 
can reason about causes also via force transmis-
sion across space (action at a distance) and time 
(detached representations).
Tracking behaviour and grades of 
causal understanding 
We sometimes share behaviours, such as tool 
use or learning by imitation, with nonhuman 
animals, but responding to our own visual tracks, 
or to those of other species, seems exclusive to 
humans. Other terrestrial animals are depend-
ent on scent when following a trail, or follow 
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sound and sight cues (i.e., reacting to noises or 
the movement of creatures). It thus appears that 
the aptitude for tracking, based on inanimate 
visual cues, developed only in the hominin clade 
(e.g., Calvin & Bickerton, 2000; Shaw-Williams, 
2014; Stuart-Fox, 2014). Hewes (1994) refers to 
the activity of tracking, which originated from 
hominins observing the effects of their own hand- 
or footprints on suitable surfaces, as a uniquely 
human semiotic process that contributed consid-
erably towards the selective evolution of Homo 
sapiens cognition. Shaw-Williams (2014, p.21) 
highlights three key differences between track-
ways and scent trails as cognitive systems, i.e.:
1) Tracks are intrinsically directional, with spa-
tiotemporal orientation that reflects the di-
rection of travel of those who left the marks. 
2) Tracks are more durable than scent trails, 
which results in the ‘scenting mind’ being 
detained in ‘here-and-now associative cogni-
tion’. The ‘tracking mind’ on the other hand 
uses detached representations and “is under 
selection to read the time stamp on every 
trackway, and respond appropriately”.
3) In contrast to scent trails, tracks are com-
binatorial because they are both directional 
and durable. Multiple sets of overlaid tracks 
remain visibly detectible whereas the most 
recent scent trail tends to render older ones 
indiscernible. Tracks thus may contain lay-
ered sets of information, including past so-
cial behaviours. They can, for example, re-
veal the meeting of conspecifics, the nature 
of interaction (such as mating or fighting), 
and whether individuals subsequently trav-
elled together or went their separate ways. 
Shaw-Williams emphasises that the infor-
mation gradient of tracking is open-ended and 
steep, so that increases in cognitive capacities 
associated with learning to read trackways would 
have augmented our social and ecological fitness. 
Also, because there is no proxy reward (such as a 
stronger scent as the prey is approached), and the 
reward is often delayed, “it is very hard for a purely 
associative mind to even begin to exploit a system 
of natural signs with so much durability and infor-
mation richness” (Shaw-Williams, 2014, p.23). 
Liebenberg (1990, Ch. 3 and 2013, Ch. 6) 
reconstructs how tracking could have evolved 
through three levels of tracking complexity. He 
distinguishes between simple, systematic and 
speculative tracking. Simple tracking comprises 
following clear, easy-to-follow tracks under ideal 
tracking conditions. Such conditions would 
include prints that are not obscured by vegeta-
tion or many overlaying prints, left in soft bar-
ren substrates or snow. Systematic tracking is 
considered to be more refined than simple track-
ing, occurring under circumstances in which the 
tracks are not obvious or easy to follow. Such 
conditions require the tracker to recognise and 
interpret signs, i.e., to infer information about 
the animal s/he follows. Finally, speculative 
tracking culminates in the development of a 
working hypothesis based on the interpreta-
tion of the signs left by an animal, knowledge 
about the behavioural traits of the animal iden-
tified through its tracks and of the landscape 
in which the tracking is taking place. Once a 
hypothetical reconstruction is generated from 
the different knowledge sources in the mind of 
the tracker, s/he can look for traces where they 
can be expected – no longer bound to following 
individual signs doggedly (Liebenberg, 1990), 
i.e., no longer bound to a strictly linear track-
ing order. Both simple and systematic track-
ing require inductive-deductive reasoning, but 
speculative tracking requires much greater skill 
– it is based on hypothetico-deductive reason-
ing, which is similar to current-day scientific 
reasoning (e.g., Liebenberg, 1990, 2008; also 
see Carruthers, 2002). Below we use tracking 
behaviour as case study to hypothetically explain 
the development of the various grades of causal 
understanding on our evolution.
Grade 1: individual causal understanding and 
tracking behaviour
In terms of tracking behaviour, individual 
causal understanding simply requires that an ani-
mal or hominin is aware that it sometimes leaves 
a visible tread print. It needs not understand why 
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this is so, or that others share a similar aware-
ness. Even though there are many examples 
that may serve as evidence for individual causal 
understanding in animals as well as in infants, 
for example their behaviour in relation to mirrors 
(Gallup, 1970; Marino et al., 1994; Bard et al., 
2006; Prior et al., 2008), we are not aware of any 
work demonstrating that nonhuman animals are 
aware of their own tread prints. Grade 1 causal 
understanding relating to tracking behaviour, 
represents very basic causal understanding, which 
was probably in the cognitive range of the last 
panin-hominin common ancestor. Yet, it seems 
to have developed only in hominin cognition. 
Because it is so basic, it is plausible to suggest that 
it evolved very early within our clade, possibly 
already during the Messinian, i.e., the final stage 
of the Miocene (e.g., Stuart-Fox, 2014). In the 
context of our model, initially becoming aware 
of tracks/prints might not have had any evolu-
tionary advantage, but could have been a spin-off 
from general individual causal understanding.
Grade 2: Cued dyadic-causal understanding 
and tracking behaviour
This grade of causal understanding in track-
ing behaviour implies that an individual observes 
and understands that other conspecifics leave 
tread prints in the same way the observer does. 
Such causal awareness, in direct relation to the 
prints of others, has also not been observed in 
nonhuman animals. Yet, other activities that rep-
resent Grade 2 causal understanding have been 
recorded, for example in rough-and-tumble play 
in mammals (e.g., Bekoff & Byers, 1998), and in 
learning by imitation (e.g., Zentall 2004; Whiten 
et al., 2005, 2009). For the next grades of causal 
understanding, basic cued dyadic-causal under-
standing is a requirement. We therefore suggest 
that this grade of understanding evolved prior to 
the following grades.  
Grade 3: Conspecific mindreading and tracking 
behaviour 
Mindreading can be argued to comprise sev-
eral components that evolved gradually in ani-
mals as well as in hominins (Tomasello, 1999; 
Gärdenfors, 2003, 2007), and it is therefore 
impossible to pinpoint in time when a general 
capacity emerges. Mindreading per se is not eas-
ily connected to tracking competence, but it is 
only in combination with Grade 4 that we can 
see the effects of tracking. 
Conspecific mindreading allows me to infer 
the actions and motivations of others in the recent 
past and the present, without observing them 
directly. I am able to infer what tracking actions I 
need to follow, as well as the short-term sequence 
in which to follow them, with the goal to find 
social and/or physical reward amongst conspecif-
ics, or avoiding enemies, which would increase 
my chances of survival. Shaw-Williams (2014) 
argues that the need to find out what kin were 
doing, or in which direction they were travelling, 
and assessing the imagined information against 
the individual’s own needs for rewards such as 
pair bonding, food or safety, would have been a 
strong motivation for our hominin ancestors to 
invest in simple, conspecific tracking behaviour. 
Grade 4: Detached dyadic-causal understanding
At this grade of causal understanding, it is 
understood that an imprint (track) indicates the 
previous presence of an individual, either the 
printmaker him-/herself or another conspecific. 
On a cognitive level, a limited time detachment 
(perception of the recent past) is introduced 
together with a mental image of someone being 
in a certain space, and the notion that conspe-
cifics share a similar understanding. No extant 
species, other than humans, are known to follow 
inanimate visual cues such as tracks. For example, 
even when adult chimpanzees hunt conspecifics 
in a highly coordinated manner (e.g., Boesch & 
Boesch-Achermann, 2000), they do not display 
any awareness of the target individual’s tracks 
(Shaw-Williams, 2014).
The 3.6 million-year-old Laetoli tracks (e.g., 
Leakey & Harris, 1987), are widely accepted to 
be that of australopithecines (but see Tuttle et 
al., 1991). Whereas it is not yet certain whether 
the australopithecines are ancestral to living 
humans, work on the recently discovered H. nal-
edi from South Africa indicates that it has certain 
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humanlike characteristics (i.e., stature, hand 
and wrist as well as foot and lower limb adapta-
tions) and that its unique cranial morphology is 
most similar to early Homo species (Berger et al., 
2015). On the other hand, the small endocra-
nial volume and some the postcranial elements 
(e.g., trunk, shoulder, pelvis and proximal femur) 
are australopith-like. These findings led to the 
hypothesis that the common ancestor of H. nal-
edi, H. erectus, and H. sapiens was intermediary 
between the australopiths and the Homo lineage 
(Berger et al. 2015).
The double trail of larger footprints from 
Laetoli are often interpreted to have been made 
by two individuals, one walking in front of 
the other, with the smaller follower stepping 
intentionally and exactly into the tracks of the 
larger one (e.g., White & Suwa, 1987; Agnew 
& Demas, 1998; Shaw-Williams, 2014). If this 
interpretation is correct, it represents the earli-
est known indication of detached dyadic-causal 
understanding through ‘tracking’ in the hominin 
lineage. It is impossible to say whether the fol-
lower was in visual proximity of the leader at the 
time, the most parsimonious inference would 
be that s/he was. Aiming to tread accurately in 
the footprint of someone else (whether with the 
aim to follow or as simple material engagement), 
however, requires centred attention on the prints 
left by another, rather than on their maker. A cer-
tain level of detachment is thus introduced. 
Combining grades 3 and 4 leads to further 
expansions of tracking abilities. When an indi-
vidual is able to understand and analyse their 
own causal motivations, and comprehends that 
tracks contain information about themselves 
and/or others, basic levels of inductive-deductive 
reasoning can be used to assess the information 
contained within a conspecific trail, and about 
the most likely consequences of following such 
a trail. For example, I understand the workings 
of the minds of others because I am aware of the 
workings of my own mind, and I can place myself 
‘on the trail’ of another. Thus, when I see conspe-
cific trails leading away from a water source, I 
might infer that those who made the tracks have 
quenched their thirst and are now looking for a 
safe place to eat or rest. Depending on my own 
immediate needs, I might choose to go in the 
opposite direction of the trail to have a drink of 
water, or to follow the direction of the trail on 
the general assumption that I might find a group 
of conspecifics, whom I associate (consciously or 
subconsciously) with safety and/or food. 
Grade 5: Causal understanding and mindreading 
of non-conspecifics and tracking behaviour
We have described the fifth grade as the 
causal understanding and mindreading of ani-
mals by humans. Placing causal understanding 
of human behaviour before causal understanding 
of other animals accords with Shaw-Williams’ 
(2014) Social Trackways Theory. Whereas track-
ing behaviours up to this point were mainly 
focused on hominin conspecifics in the context 
of social manoeuvring, the benefits and dangers 
of strategic scavenging would have urged them 
to also apply their tracking skills to other ani-
mals. For example, the eminent danger of large 
predators might have drawn hominin attention 
to their tracks (Shaw-Williams, 2014). Similar to 
the understanding of non-kin conspecifics (e.g., 
Barrett et al., 2010), becoming increasingly aware 
that other animals can be understood in analo-
gous causal terms, would have been a complex, 
incremental process. Aspects in the evolution of 
human mindreading, probably overlapped with 
animal mindreading by humans through time 
and across space.
During the 2 million years preceding early 
evidence for spear hunting by ~500-300 thou-
sand years ago (e.g., Thieme, 2000; Sahle et al., 
2013; Wilkins et al., 2012), opportunistic homi-
nin scavenging matured into well-developed stra-
tegic scavenging assisted by object throwing (e.g. 
Lieberman et al., 2009), perhaps even killing nat-
urally trapped or weakened animals through ston-
ing. Such scavenging and/or rudimentary hunt-
ing techniques do not necessitate the tracking of 
animals. It would have benefitted, however, from 
all the previously mentioned grades of causal 
understanding including cooperation and com-
petitive strategies through conspecific mindread-
ing and the associated conspecific tracking skills. 
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On the other hand, the challenges and dangers 
experienced during such activities would have 
provided the selective pressures for our ancestors 
to become proficient in tracking animals. There 
is also little doubt that the long period between 
about 2 million years and 500-300 thousand 
years ago saw hominin meat-getting strategies 
advance from scavenging (probably including the 
foraging and killing of easy-to-catch prey such as 
tortoises and mud-stuck mammals) into hunt-
ing with rudimentary spears, which might have 
included simple tracking strategies.
Grade 6: Inanimate causal understanding and 
tracking behaviour
Whereas some groups probably already applied 
aspects of systematic tracking during earlier grades 
of causal understanding, we suggest that there is 
good circumstantial evidence for its practice after 
about 300 ka in combination with increasingly 
robust evidence for spear hunting (e.g., Sahle et 
al., 2013). Systematic tracking would involve 
understanding that the direction in which grass 
is bent signifies the travel direction of a prey ani-
mal. Even in conditions where there are no visible 
tread prints, skilled systematic trackers are able 
to follow grass trails at a fast pace (Liebenberg, 
1990). Whether in grass- or woodlands, animals 
often create and use paths when moving from 
one locality to another. Tread prints in exposed 
path patches or the paths themselves would have 
enabled systematic trackers to locate prey animals 
(Liebenberg, 1990). Thus, during systematic 
tracking, the emphasis is primarily on gathering 
empirical evidence in the form of tread prints 
and other inanimate signs, enabling the hunter 
to reconstruct an animal’s activities (Liebenberg, 
1990). By the time that H. sapiens appeared, at 
about 200 ka, it is thus possible that some groups 
were highly skilled systematic trackers, who were 
able to glean information associated with conspe-
cifics and other animals, not only through their 
tracks, but also through understanding the related 
inanimate signs. Multi-stranded evidence for the 
production and use of hafted technologies dur-
ing this phase (e.g., Mazza et al., 2006; Rots & 
Van Peer, 2006; Rots et al., 2011; Rots, 2013), 
indicates clearly that early humans developed 
relatively high levels of inanimate causal under-
standing before 100 thousand years ago. To which 
extent such understanding was abstracted is, how-
ever, not clear from the archaeological record.
Grade 7: Causal network understanding or causal 
grammar and tracking behaviour
We suggest that speculative tracking as 
described by Liebenberg (1990, 2013) shows the 
ability to draw together domain-specific nodes 
into inter-domain networks of abstract causal 
understanding. Intimate knowledge of kin, 
non-kin and animal behaviour and their inani-
mate signs, are incorporated with knowledge 
about the landscape (its geographic features, 
water sources, vegetation, etc.), abstract causal 
understanding and the mental maps, thought 
processes and social contexts of the tracker. 
Speculative tracking demonstrates how humans 
create meaningful causal network hypotheses. 
For example, Liebenberg (1990, Ch. 4) suggests 
that speculative tracking requires the interpre-
tation of signs in terms of creative/imaginative 
hypotheses to deal with complex, dynamic vari-
ables (Liebenberg, 1990). 
For example, current-day Kalahari bow hunt-
ers create imaginative reconstructions to inter-
pret the actions and states of the animals they 
intend hunting. Based on these reconstructions, 
the hunter creates novel predictions in endlessly 
unique/changing circumstances. Speculative 
tracking thus involves a continuous cognitive 
process of ‘conjecture and refutation’ to deal 
with complex, dynamic variables (Liebenberg, 
1990). When expectations are confirmed, the 
hypothetical reconstructions are reinforced, but 
when expectations prove incorrect, the working 
hypotheses are revised and alternatives are inves-
tigated. With a hypothetical reconstruction of 
the animal’s activities in mind, trackers can plan 
ahead and look for animals and/or their signs 
where they expect to find them (Liebenberg, 
1990), no longer having to rely only on following 
visual cues – thus some of the tracking activity 
now happens abstractly, in the mind of the tracker. 
This way of thinking (i.e., hypothetico-deductive 
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thinking in tracking behaviour) is similar to sci-
entific reasoning that is congruent with advanced 
forms of causal grammar. 
The ability to generate inter-domain causal 
networks, use network understanding to specu-
late about potential outcomes, test and re-adjust 
our imaginative hypotheses, and to shift atten-
tion from one target to another, while keeping in 
mind the ultimate goal (e.g., subsistence) over an 
extended period of time is unique to the human 
mind of today. Even when Kalahari bow hunters 
use poisoned arrows, they often track wounded 
animals through the African bush for several 
days. Such extended pursuits will inevitably force 
them to deal with difficult tracking conditions 
and continuous terrain changes, such as those 
suggested by Liebenberg (1990), to have stimu-
lated the development of speculative tracking. 
Bow hunting is thus far exclusive to H. sapi-
ens and could date to between 70 and 65 thou-
sand years ago in southern Africa (e.g., Lombard, 
2011; Brown et al., 2012). This technology has 
been shown to demonstrate complex levels of cog-
nition (e.g., Lombard & Haidle, 2012; Williams 
et al., 2014; Coolidge et al., 2016), is currently 
closely linked with speculative tracking (e.g., 
Liebenberg, 1990), and serves as another perfect 
example of the human ability for inter-domain 
causal understanding. In bow hunting, we see 
how the causal understanding of the advantages of 
hunting with a sharp projectile is married with the 
abstract causal understanding that the power of 
stored mechanical energy can overcome physical 
challenges, such as the limited reach of a spear, to 
brace subsistence and/or conflict strategies. What 
is more, ultimately we understood on abstract 
levels that the energy of a strung bow can be har-
nessed to drill holes (bow drills), make fires (fire 
drills) or to even play music (musical bows used 
by Kalahari hunters) (see Lombard, 2016). Taken 
together, this amounts to a causal grammar. As 
far as we are aware, none of these technologies are 
unambiguously represented in the archaeologi-
cal records of anybody but H. sapiens. Advanced 
grades of causal grammar might thus be unique to 
us, and might have assisted our successful spread 
across the globe, outsmarting all others.
Concluding discussion
The theoretical framework of this paper is a 
7-grade model for the evolution of causal cogni-
tion, based on the levels of detachment from ego-
centric learning or individual understanding. We 
submit that, compared to Woodward’s (2011) 
classification, ours provides a more fine-grained 
understanding of the evolution of causal cogni-
tion, testable against empirical data from the pal-
aeoanthropological and archaeological records. 
Similar to Shaw-Williams (2014), our model 
suggests that early stages of tracking behaviour 
evolved in the context on conspecific social 
behaviours. An increasing awareness of the rich 
body of information that can be gleaned from 
inanimate traces left by other creatures was then 
applied to improve chances of survival, for exam-
ple, to avoid predators or enemies, and was sub-
sequently mapped onto subsistence behaviours 
such as the scavenging and hunting of animals 
(also see, e.g., Stuart-Fox, 2014). 
Both the social and subsistence scenarios 
have strong selective advantages that would have 
encouraged ever increasingly levels of complex-
ity and flexibility in our tracking behaviours 
and causal understanding. For example, Shaw-
Williams (2014) argues that the need to find out 
what kin are doing or in which direction they are 
travelling, and assessing the imagined information 
against the individual’s own needs for rewards 
(such as pair bonding, food or safety) would 
have been a strong motivation for our hominin 
ancestors to invest in simple tracking behaviour, 
providing impetus for the evolution of systematic 
tracking. Furthermore, Stuart-Fox (2014, p.12) 
suggests that the evolution of causal cognition, 
associated with the ‘reading’ of tracks was likely 
“a significant driver in the evolution of language”, 
a distinctly human social behaviour (also see 
Liebenberg 2013, Ch. 9). Barrett and colleagues 
(2010) also suggest that there is a co-evolutionary 
relationship between human cooperation and our 
skills in social causal cognition, including human 
mindreading (see also Gärdenfors, 2012). They 
propose, however, that unlike awareness amongst 
kin, detecting the internal states of non-kin 
230 Evolution of causal cognition
followed a prolonged and complex evolution-
ary path, incrementally improving our ability to 
“react strategically to the social world via progres-
sively more fine-tuned capacities to detect and 
represent its hidden causal structure” (Barrett et 
al., 2010, p.523). 
If we accept that the initial grades of causal 
understanding in tracking behaviour were trig-
gered socially, population increases and expan-
sions would have shaped the evolutionary tra-
jectory of hominin tracking behaviour. Initially, 
kin-based tracking would have been adequate for 
rudimentary social/survival rewards. However, 
as group and population sizes increased, and as 
bands of our ancestors started to move into previ-
ously unknown terrain, it would have been ben-
eficial to develop strategies to manage coopera-
tion, competition and hostility during intra- and 
inter-group engagement with non-kin conspecif-
ics. One of these behaviours would have been 
inductive-deductive reasoning about the tracks 
and trails of non-kin, either to engage with them 
cooperatively, to compete with them for resources 
(such as food, mates or shelter), to avoid engage-
ment which might result in conflict, or to estab-
lish territories by engaging in conflict. Regarding 
subsistence behaviour, Stuart-Fox (2014) suggests 
that the skill to glean the potentially rich infor-
mation inherent in indirect natural signs (such as 
tracks and other associated visual signs) was prob-
ably very useful for the location of potential food 
sources and/or avoiding predators. Meat-hungry 
hominins would clearly benefit from understand-
ing animal behaviours in a way that would either 
lead them towards or away from them, depend-
ing on perceived context. 
By choosing ‘grades’ to discriminate between 
our categories it is implied that they probably 
phased into each other throughout our evolution. 
It is key, however, to recognise that even though 
the simpler grades of causal understanding support 
or scaffold the more complex ones, our framework 
does not necessarily denote a unilinear evolution-
ary trajectory (e.g., Haidle et al., 2015; Lombard, 
2016). Within each grade of causal understanding 
there might be several levels of complexity that 
developed at different times in different places and/
or hominin populations. For example, basic, con-
specific mindreading skills (Grade 3 above) might 
have been acquired early on in our evolution. 
However, enhanced levels of human mindreading, 
or theory of mind, that enable us to cope with the 
complexities of our current societies, might only 
have evolved at a much later stage, i.e., after we 
were able to understand and interpret the behav-
iours of non-conspecifics (Tomasello et al., 2005; 
Gärdenfors, 2007). Thus, a newly identified grade 
of causal understanding does not automatically 
imply that all or some aspects of the previously 
identified grade stopped its evolutionary trajectory.
In summary, our suggested model progresses 
from an egocentric understanding of inanimate 
visual cues to an understanding that others leave 
similar signs, and that those signs obtain a wealth of 
information in the context of managing associations 
with conspecific kin and non-kin. Later, we came 
to understand that we could use the inanimate vis-
ual signs left by animals to avoid predators and to 
enhance our subsistence niche until we became the 
ultimate trackers and hunters, drawing on inter-
domain causal networks to outsmart all other spe-
cies. Tenenbaum & Niyogi (2003, p.1152) write: 
“A causal grammar defines a system for generating 
causal networks, by first choosing a subset of nodes 
in each class and then inserting links between those 
nodes in conformance with the link rules”. Causal 
grammar generates an infinite set of integrated 
networks for understanding, hypothesising and 
imagining. Grade 7 causal understanding therefore 
provides the principles that allow humans to cre-
ate meaningful causal network hypotheses, which 
facilitate learning and reasoning about novel causal 
systems in a very effective manner (Tenenbaum 
& Niyogi, 2003). It enables the uniquely modern 
human trait of boundless behavioural and cogni-
tive flexibility as expressed in current technological 
and scientific innovations.
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